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OPINION OF THE COURT 
        
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
Rodney Burns appeals the district court‘s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of all defendants in the suit he 
brought against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
(―DOC‖) and several Department employees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm in 
part and reverse in part.
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I.  Facts and Procedural History 
The background of this dispute has been described in 
detail by both this court and the district court.  See Burns v. 
Penn. Dept. of Corr., 544 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2008) (―Burns 
1‖); Burns v. Penn. Dept. of Corr., 2009 WL 1475274 
                                                 
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343.  We have jurisdiction 




(E.D.Pa. May 26, 2009); and Burns v. Penn. Dept. of Corr., 
2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8679, (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2007).  
Accordingly, we will only set forth the facts that are relevant 
to this appeal.  
A. The Alleged Misconduct  
On February 14, 2005, a corrections officer at the State 
Correctional Institute at Graterford discovered that inmate 
Charles Mobley had burns on his face that had been caused 
by another inmate throwing scalding water on him four days 
earlier.  Although Mobley did not know the assailant, he 
initially said that the inmate who assaulted him occupied cell 
BA-1022.  One of the two occupants of that cell, Ricky 
Holmes, was placed in administrative custody during the 
investigation that followed.  
SCI Graterford has a special hotline phone number that 
is given to a select number of inmates who can use it to 
provide confidential information to corrections officials.  Two 
callers used the hotline to report that Burns, and not Holmes, 
was responsible for the assault.  Defendant Thomas Dohman, 
Captain of Security at SCI Graterford, believed this 
information to be credible because he recognized the voices 
and knew that the callers had previously provided reliable 
information.  Dohman therefore concluded that Mobley had 
mistakenly identified Holmes instead of Burns because they 
were similar in appearance and because Mobley, an older 
inmate, was ―semi-coherent‖ at times, making it plausible that 
his identification was simply wrong.  
Burns claims that when Dohman subsequently 
interviewed him, Dohman told him that the incident had been 
recorded on a video surveillance camera and that the 
videotape showed Burns committing the assault.  Dohman 
disputes this account.  He insists that the assault was not 
recorded and that he never told Burns otherwise.   
Although Burns denied any involvement, Dohman 
issued a misconduct report charging Burns with assaulting 
Mobley.  That report stated that the charges were based on 
statements from two reliable confidential informants who had 
witnessed the assault as well as information from other 
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inmates given to another corrections officer, Lt. Abdul 
Ansari.   
B. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Disciplinary 
Scheme  
The Pennsylvania Administrative Code establishes a 
baseline policy for prisons to manage disciplinary infractions.  
See generally 37 Pa. Code § 93.10.  As part of that policy, 
prisons must develop ―[w]ritten procedures which conform to 
established principles of law for inmate discipline‖ that 
include, at minimum, ―[w]ritten notice of charges,‖ a 
―[h]earing before an impartial hearing examiner,‖ an 
―[o]pportunity for the inmate to tell his story and to present 
relevant evidence,‖ ―[a]ssistance from an inmate or staff 
member at the hearing if the inmate is unable to collect and 
present evidence effectively,‖ a ―[w]ritten statement of the 
decision and reasoning of the hearing body, based upon the 
preponderance of the evidence,‖ and an ―[o]pportunit[y] to 
appeal the misconduct decision in accordance with 
procedures in the Department of Corrections Inmate 
Handbook.‖ Id.   
The Administrative Code also lists types of sanctions 
that may be imposed if an inmate is convicted of a 
disciplinary infraction.  37 Pa. Code § 93.10(a).  Depending 
on the type of misconduct, those sanctions include ―[c]hange 
of cell assignment, including placement in the restricted 
housing unit or restrictive confinement in a general 
population cell . . . [,]‖ ―[s]uspension of privileges for a 
specified period of time[,]‖ and ―[c]hange, suspension or 
removal from job.‖  Id.   
Additionally, an inmate found guilty of misconduct 
can be sanctioned for ―[p]ayment of the fair value of property 
lost or destroyed or for expenses incurred as a result of the 
misconduct.‖ Id.  One type of ―expenses‖ that can be 
―incur[ed] as a result of the misconduct‖ is medical expenses.  
The Pennsylvania Administrative Code also establishes 
regulations for medical treatment of prisoners.  See generally 
37 Pa. Code § 93.12.  While the Department of Corrections 
provides some prisoner medical services for free, other 
medical services incur a charge.  The Administrative Code 
also provides that ―[t]he Department will charge a fee to an 
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inmate for any of the following . . .  (4) Medical service 
provided to another inmate as a result of assaultive conduct 
engaged in by an inmate to be charged the fee.‖ 37 Pa. Code § 
93.12(c).  As a result, prisoners who are found guilty of 
assaults in which the victim needs medical treatment may be 
required to pay the cost of the treatment. 
C. Burns’ Disciplinary Hearing 
After Dohman issued the misconduct report, Burns 
responded by filing timely requests to call Mobley as a 
witness at his disciplinary hearing and to present the 
purported videotape of the incident.
2
   Both requests were 
consistent with the prison‘s disciplinary procedures.   
Burns renewed his request for the production of the 
videotape when his disciplinary hearing began.  Mary Canino, 
the hearing officer, responded by continuing the hearing to 
investigate Burns‘ request.  Five days later, Canino conducted 
an in camera proceeding during which Dohman told Canino 
that the incident had not been recorded.  However, Canino did 
not attempt to view the relevant tapes in order to resolve the 
conflict between that representation and Burns‘ statement that 
Dohman had told him that the incident had been recorded.
3
 
Dohman also testified about the confidential informants 
                                                 
2
 The prison had a policy of retaining surveillance 
tapes for 60 days before reusing them.  Based on that policy, 
and since Burns‘ request was within that 60 day window, we 
assume that the tape was still available when Burns made his 
request.   
3
 In her deposition, Officer Canino stated that she 
could not remember if she viewed the videotape, the 
videotape did not exist, or if she relied upon Dohman‘s 
statement that there was nothing relevant on the videotape.  
Ex. 3 at 27-28 (Canino deposition).  She did indicate, 
however, that it was her standard procedure to ask the prison 
official if an incident had been recorded. Ex. 3 at 27 (Canino 
deposition) (―Q. How would you determine [if there was a 
videotape to view]‖ A. . . . I would ask Captain Dohman was 
there a tape on this incident and he would say ‗yes‘ or ‗no.‘ If 
there was a tape on the incident, I would review the tape.  
And if the camera was pointed [away from the incident that 
occurred, she would indicate that in the record.]‖) 
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during the in camera proceeding.  However, he did not reveal 
their names to Canino, and Canino did not receive any direct 
testimony from them, either in writing or in person.  Canino 
also met with Mobley in camera, but he refused to testify 
either in camera or at the disciplinary hearing.  Canino 
accepted Mobley‘s refusal to testify, and did not inquire into 
why Mobley refused.
4
   
Canino then reconvened the hearing with Burns 
present.  She informed Burns that Mobley had refused to 
testify and that there was no videotape of the incident.  She 
also informed Burns that she found the information from the 
confidential informants credible and reliable.  She then found 
Burns guilty of the assault.  As a result, she imposed the 
following sanctions: 180 days of disciplinary confinement in 
a restricted housing unit (―RHU‖), and loss of his prison job.  
Canino also assessed Burns‘ prison account for the amount of 
Mobley‘s medical expenses resulting from the assault.  
Despite the assessment, prison administrators did not deduct 
any part of Mobley‘s medical expenses from Burns‘ inmate 
account.  Nevertheless, the threat of assessment remained for 
several years, and that continuing threat was the initial focus 
of this suit.  
D.  Subsequent Procedural History  
After his administrative appeals were unsuccessful,  
Burns filed this pro se § 1983 action in the district court 
claiming that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections 
and certain officials violated his due process rights during the 
prison‘s disciplinary proceedings when it assessed his prison 
account.
5
  The district court granted summary judgment in 
favor of the defendants on all counts after concluding that the 
assessment of  Burns‘ account was not a sufficient liberty or 
property interest to support a claim under § 1983.  
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  Canino speculated that Mobley may have been 
concerned for his safety, but this speculation was not based 
on anything Mobley said. 
5
  After Burns filed his suit pro se, counsel was 
appointed to represent him.  
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Burns appealed that judgment, and we reversed and 
remanded.
6
   We held that ―the Department of Corrections‘ 
assessment of Burns‘ institutional account constituted the 
deprivation of a protected property interest for purposes of 
procedural due process‖ and ―[t]hat deprivation [was] 
sufficient to trigger the protections of the Due Process 
Clause.‖  Burns, 544 F.3d at 291.  However, we remanded the 
case so that the district court could determine what process 
Burns was due and whether the disciplinary hearing described 
above satisfied the procedural protections Burns was entitled 
to under the Due Process Clause.  If the district court found 
that due process was violated, the question of remedies also 
needed to be addressed. 
On remand, the district court found that Burns‘ due 
process rights had been violated by the hearing officer‘s 
failure to independently evaluate the credibility of the 
confidential informants, but it did not find that Burns‘ 
procedural due process rights were violated by the hearing 
officer‘s refusal to compel Mobley‘s testimony or by her 
failure to view the alleged videotape.   Despite finding a due 
process violation, the court found that the state officials were 
protected by qualified immunity and that Burns could 
therefore not recover damages from them.  Burns v. PA Dept. 
of Corr., 2009 WL 1475274, *5 (E.D. Pa. May 26, 2009). The 
court did, however, grant Burns‘ request for a declaration that 
his prison account could not be assessed.  The district court 
denied all of Burns‘ other requests for injunctive relief. 
Burns now argues that his right to due process was 
also violated by the hearing officer‘s failure to compel 
Mobley to testify as well as her failure to view the videotape, 
that the prison officials are not entitled to qualified immunity, 
and that the district court erred in denying his requests for 
                                                 
6
  Following oral argument that occurred during the 
initial appeal, the DOC sent a letter to Burns declaring that it 
would not deduct money from his inmate account to assess 
him for expenses arising from the assault as allowed by the 
hearing officer's order. The DOC then argued that Burns' 
appeal was therefore moot.  That claim of mootness was 
rejected. See Burns, 544 F.3d at 283. 
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relief for the harms he suffered as a result of the violation of 
due process. 
II. Standards of Review 
 ―We review an award of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same test on review that the District Court 
should have applied.‖ MBIA Ins. Corp. v. Royal Indem. Co., 
426 F.3d 204, 209 (3d Cir. 2005).  On summary judgment, we 
review ―the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party and draw all inferences in that party‘s favor.‖ 
Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994).  
We review the district court‘s grant of qualified immunity de 
novo as it raises a purely legal issue. Curley v. Klem, 298 F.3d 
271, 279 (3d Cir. 2002).   
We generally review a district court‘s grant of relief 
for abuse of discretion, but ―we must exercise a plenary 
review of the trial court's choice and interpretation of legal 
precepts and its application of those precepts to the historical 
facts.‖ Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. Hughes & Co., 669 
F.2d 98, 103 (3d Cir. 1981). 
III. Due Process 
It is well established that ―[p]risoners . . . may not be 
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of 
law.‖  Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).   
However, inmates are generally not entitled to procedural due 
process in prison disciplinary hearings because the sanctions 
resulting from those hearings do not usually affect a protected 
liberty interest.  See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483-84 
(1995) (holding that not all sanctions resulting from prison 
disciplinary hearings affect protected liberty interests).  Burns 
does not assert here that any of the sanctions imposed by 
Hearing Officer Canino—including his prison transfer, his 
security level, and his 180-day sentence in the SHU—affects 
any protected liberty interest.  Nor does Burns have a 
property interest in his prison job.
7
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 Burns does assert that he is entitled to remedies 
because of these sanctions based upon his contention that they 
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We have already determined that Burns does have a 
protected property interest in  the assessment of his prison 
account and was therefore entitled to due process prior to the 
assessment of his account.  See Burns, 544 F.3d at 291 
(―[W]e are satisfied that the Department of Corrections‘ 
assessment of Burns‘ institutional account constituted the 
deprivation of a protected property interest for purposes of 
procedural due process.‖).   
Pennsylvania‘s Administrative Code allows an 
inmate‘s account to be assessed in two different 
circumstances.  First, the Code establishes that if an inmate is 
found to have engaged in misconduct, the ―sanction‖ may 
include ―[p]ayment of the fair value of property lost or 
destroyed or for expenses [including medical expenses] 
incurred as a result of the misconduct.‖ 97 Pa. Code § 
93.10(a).  Elsewhere, the Code requires that the Department 
of Corrections ―will‖ charge that inmate‘s prison account for 
the costs of treating his victim‘s injuries.  
As noted, we held in Burns I, that ―a disciplinary 
conviction directing that an inmate's institutional account be 
assessed for medical or other expenses implicates a property 
interest sufficient to trigger the protections of procedural due 
process. . .‖. 544 F.3d  at 280.  Thus, Burns was entitled to 
procedural due process at his disciplinary hearing because 
assessment of his inmate account for the costs of Mobley‘s 
medical expenses was a possible consequence of conviction 
of the infractions he was charged with.  
However, the parameters of that due due process are 
not readily defined because loss of liberty is a normal 
consequence of a criminal conviction.  See Sandin, 515 U.S. 
at 487 (―The regime to which he was subjected as a result of 
the misconduct hearing was within the range of confinement 
to be normally expected for one serving [a prison sentence]‖). 
 On remand, the district court found that Hearing 
Officer Canino had violated Burns‘ right to due process by 
relying on the statement of two unnamed confidential 
informants without independently evaluating their reliability 
                                                                                                             
were the result of a constitutionally flawed hearing.  This 
issue is discussed more fully in Part V. 
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and credibility. Burns, 2009 WL 1475274, *13-14.  The 
Commonwealth does not appeal that ruling.   However, Burns 
appeals the district court‘s conclusion that Canino‘s refusal to 
personally view the videotape and her refusal to force Mobley 
to testify also violated Burns‘ due process rights.  
Burns claims that Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 
(1974), should govern our due process inquiry into the 
procedural protection he was due in his prison disciplinary 
hearing.  In Wolff, the Supreme Court outlined the basic 
process inmates are entitled to when prison officials seek to 
deprive them of good-time credits, a protected liberty interest.  
The district court‘s due process analysis was based on Wolff.  
Burns, 2009 WL 1475274, *10.   
The Commonwealth argues that Wolff does not apply.  
It claims that ―no decision by the Supreme Court has found 
Wolff applicable in an inmate‘s deprivation-of-property case.‖ 
Appellee‘s Br. at 23. The Commonwealth thus attempts to 
distinguish between deprivations of liberty and deprivations 
of property and argues that Wolff only applies to the former 
while two other Supreme Court cases - Paratt v. Taylor, 451 
U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 
474 U.S. 327 (1986), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 
(1984) - apply to the latter. 
We are not persuaded.  Wolff itself notes that its due 
process analysis applies regardless of whether the deprivation 
is of liberty or property: ―This analysis as to liberty parallels 
the accepted due process analysis as to property.  The Court 
has consistently held that some kind of hearing is required at 
some time before a person is finally deprived for his property 
interests. . . . We think a person‘s liberty is equally protected 
[as that of his or her property] . . . .‖ 418 U.S. at 557-58. 
Moreover Paratt and Hudson only address post-
deprivation remedies of unauthorized or unintentional 
deprivations of property.  Unlike Wolff, which addresses the 
state‘s obligation to provide pre-deprivation notice and a 
hearing,  Paratt involved  a prisoner‘s mail packages being 
negligently misplaced, 451 U.S. at 529, and the process due 
after that deprivation.  Hudson extended this post-deprivation 
analysis to the process an inmate is due after a prison guard‘s 
unauthorized destruction of an inmate‘s property, 468 U.S. at 
11 
 
520. Thus, neither case is helpful to our inquiry into the 
process that should have been afforded before the deprivation 
that occurred here, where pre-deprivation notice and 
opportunity to be heard were part of an established process.  
 ―[W]e must balance the inmate‘s interest . . . against 
the needs of the prison, and some amount of flexibility and 
accommodation is required.‖  Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.  The 
district court began its analysis by reasoning that 
[t]he newly recognized property interest at 
issue here – the security of a prisoner‘s 
account – is a less important private interest 
than the good time credits at issue in Wolff. . . 
. The reduction in the economic value of 
Burns‘ institutional account and the threat of 
appropriation, although it lasted three years, 
was so minor that the Court must conclude 
that this is a less weighty interest than a 
possible extension on a term of 
imprisonment[.]  
 
Burns, 2009 WL 1475274, *11.  In a footnote, the 
court further noted that ―[h]ad Burns‘ account 
actually been assessed, the maximum amount for 
which he could have been liable was $10.00.‖  Id. at 
19 n.7. 
We do not fully agree with the court‘s framing of the 
issue.  First, as both the Commonwealth and Burns recognize 
in their briefs, when Canino assessed Burns‘ account, she 
believed that the assessment could be much larger than 
$10.00, possibly including the costly prospect of covering 
plastic surgery Mobley may have needed.
 8
  See Appellant‘s 
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 Canino‘s deposition reads: 
―Q. And you wrote here that you assessed the inmate‘s 
– to assess the inmate‘s account for medical or other 
expenses.  That would be the medical expenses for Mr. 
Mobley? 
A. Plastic surgery or whatever.  I‘m not a doctor. 
Whatever it takes to make him right. 
12 
 
Br. at 46 n.15, Appellee‘s Br. at 16 n.18.  Thus, although we 
now know that Burns‘ exposure was less than $10, the 
exposure appeared far more substantial at the time of the 
hearing.   
Second, although a prisoner‘s interest in freedom is 
certainly paramount, we are not willing to ignore his/her 
interest in property,
9
 nor are we willing to say that it is so de 
minimus that the requirements of the Due Process Clause are 
substantially reduced.  As we have already noted, the 
Supreme Court was careful to explain that ―a person‘s liberty 
is equally protected [as his or her property] . . . .‖ Wolff, 418 
U.S. at 557-58.            
Rather, we must balance the legitimate interests of 
both the state and the inmate while affording deference to the 
unique institutional concerns that arise in the prison setting. 
Wolff, 468 U.S. at 562.  The appropriate balance must 
recognize these competing interests when determining what 
process is due.  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-
35 (1976).   
A. Documentary Evidence 
As noted earlier, during his disciplinary hearing, Burns 
requested that a videotape of the incident be presented as 
permitted under prison policy.  The requested tape appeared 
relevant because Burns alleged that Dohman told him that the 
assault was recorded  by surveillance cameras.  Burns claims 
that the videotape would have exonerated him because it 
would have shown the real assailant.  As also noted, Captain 
Dohman claims he never told Burns there was a videotape, 
and he told Hearing Officer Canino that the assault had not 
been recorded.  Canino does not remember if she ever viewed 
the videotape.   
                                                                                                             
Q. Were there any other expenses you had in mind 
other than medical expenses.   
A. I think that was basically it.‖  
 Exhibit 3 at 79-80 (Canino deposition). 
9
 For example, an inmate‘s prison account may be the 
only means of paying for long distance phone calls to family 
or others in his/her support network.   
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Because we are reviewing a grant of summary 
judgment, we must view the facts in the light most favorable 
to the nonmoving party.  Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 
768, 777 (3d. Cir 1994).  We must therefore assume that 
Canino did not view the videotape.  However, we make no 
assumptions about what, if anything, was then recorded on 
the videotape.  
It is clearly established that due process requires that 
an inmate be permitted to ―present documentary evidence in 
his defense when permitting him to do so will not be unduly 
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.‖ Wolff, 
418 U.S. at 566.  Although prison officials are afforded 
deference regarding whether evidence might be unduly 
hazardous or undermine institutional safety or correctional 
goals, ―the discretion afforded prison officials is not without 
limits.‖ Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1400 (3d Cir. 1991). 
In Dalton v. Hutton, 713 F.2d 75 (4th Cir. 1983), the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dealt with a similar 
issue. Although that case is not ―on all fours‖ with the 
circumstances here, the court‘s analysis is helpful.  There, an 
inmate asked two prison officials to testify in his behalf at 
disciplinary proceedings arising from a prison disturbance; 
both guards declined.  Pursuant to the applicable prison 
regulations precluding inmates from calling any prison 
employees as witnesses, no efforts were made to compel their 
testimony.
10
  On appeal, the court found the regulation 
inconsistent with the inmate‘s right to due process because 
[o]ne needs no ‗right‘ to call a witness who 
voluntarily presents himself to testify.  If 
there is preclusion of an entire class of 
witnesses (i.e., anyone who would rather not 
appear), the right is dissipated in a cloud of 
verbiage. An inmate granted the right, albeit 
qualified, to call witnesses in his behalf loses 
it altogether, in any meaningful employment 
of language, if any witness may refuse to 
testify for no reason whatsoever. 
                                                 
10
 The court focused on the fact that the applicable regulation 
was a ―per se proscription against the calling of all but 
voluntary witnesses.‖  Dalton, 713 F.2d at 77. 
14 
 
 Id. at 78. 
An inmate‘s right to present documentary evidence is 
similarly undermined if prison officials can bar the inmate 
from presenting the evidence simply by denying that the 
evidence is relevant.  If a disciplinary hearing is to have any 
substance, the hearing officer must determine relevance of 
evidence, not corrections officers or employees. See Young v. 
Kann, 926 F.2d 1396, 1402 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing Helms 
v. Hewitt, 655 F.2d 487 (3d Cir. 1981), rev’d on other 
grounds, 459 U.S. 460 (1983), aff’d on remand, 712 F.2d 48 
(3d. Cir 1983)).   Deferring such a determination to the 
charging corrections officer turns the disciplinary proceeding 
into little more than the administrative equivalent of a ―show 
trial.‖ A ―right‖ to present evidence is no right at all if the 
officer overseeing a disciplinary hearing can simply decide 
not to view the evidence based on a representation of the 
prosecuting corrections officer. 
It is therefore troubling that the hearing officer here 
appeared to rely entirely on the statements of Officer Dohman 
in determining whether the videotape was relevant.  The 
problem is compounded by the fact that the record suggests 
that Officer Dohman may not even have been under oath 
when he told Canino about the videotape.  
          Burns was thus deprived of due process because his 
right to present evidence was completely undermined by the 
hearing officer‘s failure to independently determine whether 
the evidence was relevant.   
We therefore hold that an inmate‘s right to procedural 
due process is violated when a hearing examiner simply fails 
to view available evidence to determine its relevance and 
suitability for use at a disciplinary hearing. If such hearings 
are to have any substance,  the hearing officer must 
independently assess whether the evidence is relevant and 
then determine whether there are legitimate penological 
reasons to deny the prisoner access to the evidence 
requested.
11
 Although the government may have a very real 
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 This does not, of course, mean that prison officials 
must indefinitely preserve anything which may become 
evidence in a disciplinary proceeding.  Rather, where, as here, 
15 
 
interest in barring an inmate‘s access to certain documentary 
evidence, that interest is not implicated when it is provided 
only to the hearing officer, who can then independently assess 
its probative value and weigh that against any institutional 
concerns that may counsel against allowing otherwise 
probative evidence to be used at the hearing. 
B. Mobley’s Testimony 
Burns also claims that he was denied procedural due 
process when Hearing Officer  Canino denied his request to 
call Mobley as a witness.   The prison‘s policy allows an 
inmate to call up to three relevant witnesses, including one 
staff member.  Burns requested only Mobley‘s testimony.  
From what we have already stated, it should be clear 
that an ―inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be 
allowed to call witnesses and present documentary evidence 
when permitting him to do so will not be unduly hazardous to 
institutional safety or correctional goals.‖ Wolff, 418 U.S. at 
566.  The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that 
inmates are not entitled to the full panoply of constitutional 
rights.  Here again, the inmate‘s right must be balanced 
against concerns that are endemic to a situation of one inmate 
testifying against another:   
Relationships among the inmates are 
varied and complex and perhaps subject 
to the unwritten code that exhorts 
inmates not to inform on a fellow 
prisoner.  It is against this background 
                                                                                                             
an institution‘s record retention policy suggests that 
documentary evidence exists, and an inmate properly requests 
that the evidence be produced at his/her disciplinary hearing, 
due process requires that the evidence be produced unless the 
hearing officer makes an independent determination that the 
evidence is not relevant, or if relevant, should not be 
introduced because of overriding penological concerns such 
as security of the institution or safety of prison personnel or 
other inmates. Here, the prison had a policy of retaining such 
tapes for 60 days, and the hearing was held well within that 
time frame.  We must therefore assume that the tapes were 
available for Burns‘ hearing.  
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that disciplinary proceedings must be 
structured by prison authorities; and it is 
against this background that we must 
make our constitutional judgments . . . .  
 
Id. at 562. 
Here, Burns‘ desire to have Mobley testify was 
certainly reasonable since Mobley was the victim of the 
assault and presumably saw his assailant.   Hearing Officer 
Canino appropriately responded by asking Mobley to testify.
 
 
However, as we have noted, Mobley refused to testify either 
at the hearing or in camera.  He also refused to provide any 
kind of written testimony.  Canino did not explain why 
Mobley refused to testify, and it is not clear that she even 
knew Mobley‘s reasons or inquired into them.  Canino 
therefore conducted the hearing and rendered a decision 
without having the benefit of hearing what the victim knew 
about the identity of his attacker.   
 The Supreme Court has explained that ―it would be 
useful for the [prison disciplinary hearing officer] to state [his 
or her] reason for refusing to call a witness, whether it be for 
irrelevance, lack of necessity, or the hazards presented in 
individual cases.‖ Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566.   However, the 
Court has also cautioned that institutional concerns, including 
the possibility of retaliation, may make it wholly impractical 
to compel an inmate‘s testimony at a disciplinary hearing.  Id. 
at 567. 
We will therefore not conclude that a hearing officer 
must always record the reason for permitting an inmate to 
refuse to testify.  That may sometimes be as problematic as 
reporting that an inmate refused to testify out of fear of 
retaliation. These institutional concerns override Burns‘ 
interest in being able to call Mobley as a witness.  If  Burns 
had been the assailant, Mobley would either have had to 
testify truthfully and risk retaliation or perjure himself and 
thereby become the vehicle by which his assailant would 
escape sanction.   
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In Dalton, the inmate wished to call prison officials to 
testify, but under prison policy they could not be compelled to 
testify— as noted earlier, all testimony had to be voluntary.  
Dalton, 713 F.2d at 77.  While we agree with the Fourth 
Circuit that the right to call only voluntary witnesses is no 
right at all, we find no justification for extending this analysis 
so far that it would force a victim inmate to testify against 
his/her assailant, nor is Dalton to the contrary. The court was 
there concerned with a per se prohibition that did not allow 
for inmates to require testimony of anyone (including 
corrections officers), even when that testimony presented no 
institutional concerns that would have counseled against it. 
The Commonwealth‘s interest in protecting Mobley 
and managing the difficult relationships within the prison 
setting far outweigh Burns‘ right to call Mobley as a witness.  
Wolff requires ―a case-by-case analysis of the calling of 
involuntary witnesses.‖  See Forbes v. Trigg, 976 F.2d 308, 
317 (7th Cir. 1992).  Here, we conclude that the special 
circumstances involving an inmate victim, and the concerns 
about the ―unwritten code that exhorts inmates not to inform 
on a fellow prisoner,‖ Wolff, 418 U.S. at 562, outweigh the 
right Burns may have otherwise had to call an unwilling 
witness.  Accordingly, we will affirm the district court‘s 
finding that there was no due process violation in allowing 
Mobley not to testify, but we will reverse the court‘s finding 
that Burns‘ due process right was not violated by the hearing 
examiner‘s failure to view the videotape that may have 
recorded the incident. 
III. Qualified Immunity 
Finding that prison officials violated Burns‘ due 
process rights does not end our inquiry,  however.  The 
question remains whether those officials have qualified 
immunity.  Qualified immunity shields government officials 
from suit even if their actions were unconstitutional as long as 
those officials‘ actions ―d[id] not violate clearly established 
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.‖  Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 
818 (1982).  
―Qualified immunity balances two important 
interests—the need to hold public officials accountable when 
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they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield 
officials from harassment, distraction and liability when they 
perform their duties reasonably.‖ Pearson v. Callahan, --- 
U.S. ---, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815 (2009).  ―The general rule of 
qualified immunity is intended to provide government 
officials with the ability ‗reasonably [to] anticipate when their 
conduct may give rise to liability for damages.‘‖ Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 634, 645 (1987) (quoting Davis v. 
Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 195 (1984)) (alteration in original).  
The burden of establishing qualified immunity falls to the 
official claiming it as a defense.  See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819 
(describing qualified immunity as a defense and noting that 
―if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary 
circumstances and can prove that he neither knew nor should 
have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should 
be sustained‖) (emphasis added).  
For the official to have ―fair warning,‖ United States v. 
Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997), that his or her actions 
violate a person‘s rights, ―[t]he contours of the right must be 
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand 
that what he is doing violates that right.‖ Anderson v. 
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).  However, ―[t]his is not 
to say that an official action is protected by qualified 
immunity unless the very action in question has previously 
been held unlawful, but it is to say that in the light of pre-
existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.‖ Wilson v. 
Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999). 
The district court reasoned that, since our holding in 
Burns I (that Burns‘ property interest in his inmate account 
was protected under the Due Process Clause) rested upon 
sources other than our own case law, the right we recognized 
there was not ―clearly established‖ when the defendants 
assessed his account.  The district court believed that, prior to 
our holding there, procedural due process only protected an 
inmate‘s account when it was debited, and no property 
interest was implicated by the ―mere‖ assessment of the 
account.  Accordingly, the court reasoned that the defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity pursuant to Saucier v. 
Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001).  Burns I, 2007 WL 442385, *5. 
Although we believe that the question of qualified immunity 
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is a closer call than suggested by the district court‘s analysis, 
we will nevertheless affirm that court‘s holding.   
The district court was correct in concluding that our 
holding in Burns I that a prisoner has an interest in the 
security of his or her prison account was a new understanding 
of property interests protected by due process rights.  
However, that does not end our qualified immunity inquiry 
because ―officials can still be on notice that their conduct 
violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.‖ 
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).   
To determine whether a new scenario is sufficiently 
analogous to previously established law to warn an official 
that his/her conduct is unconstitutional,  we ―inquir[e] into the 
general legal principles governing analogous factual 
situations . . .  and  . . . determin[e] whether the official 
should have related this established law to the instant 
situation.‖  Hicks v. Feeney, 770 F.2d 375, 380 (3d Cir. 
1985).  ―This approach eliminates unexpected liability for 
public officials as well as prevents the occurrence of a mere 
‗factual wrinkle‘ in an area of clearly established law from 
barring suit altogether.‖ Id. (quoting People of Three Mile 
Island v. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner, 747 F.2d 139, 
148 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
Because qualified immunity is intended to protect 
officials absent ―fair warning‖ that their conduct violates 
constitutional guarantees, we examine qualified immunity 
from the perspective of the official at the time of the 
violation. We must therefore determine ―whether reasonable 
officials in their positions, with the information then available 
to them, should have known that their actions or omissions 
violated clearly established law.‖ Ryan v Burlington County, 
860 F.2d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir. 1988).
12
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 See also Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. at 202 (―The 
relevant inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable 
officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 
confronted‖); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) 
(inquiring ―whether a reasonable officer could have believed 
that [his or her action] was lawful, in light of clearly 
established law and the information that the officers 
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Here, the question is ―whether reasonable officials in 
[Hearing Examiner Canino‘s] position, with the information 
then available to [her], should have known that their actions 
[in ordering an assessment of Burns‘ prison account under the 
circumstances here] violated clearly established law.‖ Ryan, 
860 F.2d at 1204. 
At the time of Burns‘ disciplinary hearing, it was well 
established that ―[i]nmates have a property interest in funds 
held in prison accounts.‖ Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 
179 (3d. Cir. 1997) (citing Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951, 
954 (8th Cir. 1996); Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217, 222 
(7th Cir. 1986); Quick v. Jones, 754 F.2d 1521, 1523 (9th Cir. 
1985)).  Accordingly, it was clearly established that ―inmates 
are entitled to due process with respect to any deprivation of 
this money.‖ Reynolds, 128 F.3d.at 179 (citing Mahers, 76 
F.3d at 954).  To the extent that Burns I added a ―new twist,‖ 
it did so by concluding that the position of the Department of 
Corrections was similar to that of a judgment creditor when it 
assessed inmates‘ accounts even if the account was not 
debited until some point in the future.
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Under Pennsylvania law, after an inmate has been 
found responsible for an assault, ―[t]he Department [of 
Corrections] will charge a fee to an inmate for  . . . [m]edical 
service provided to another inmate as a result of assaultive 
conduct engaged in by an inmate to be charged the fee.‖ 37 
Pa. Code § 93.12(c)(4).  An ―assessment [i]s a statutorily 
                                                                                                             
possessed.‖); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 634, 641 
(1987) (―The relevant question in this case, for example, is 
the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a 
reasonable officer could have believed [the] warrantless 
search to be lawful, in light of clearly established law and the 
information the searching officers possessed.‖) 
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 In Burns 1, although we conceded that the ―analogy 
is technically imperfect,‖ we held that ―the legal right 
obtained by the Department of Corrections through its 
assessment of Burns' account mirrors the interest held by a 
Judgment Creditor under Pennsylvania law.‖ 544 F.3d at 588. 
We also noted that, the position of the Department of 




authorized consequence of [a prisoner‘s] being found guilty 
of institution misconduct.‖ Brome v. Dept. of Corr., 756 A.2d 
87, 89 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2000); see also Greene v. Dept. of Corr., 
729 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1999). 
The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania has 
previously found that the Department of Correction‘s 
procedures regarding the assessment of inmates‘ accounts 
violated due process.  In Holloway v. Lehman, 671 A.2d 1179 
(Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), the court noted that ―[i]t is beyond 
dispute that money is property.  Private property cannot be 
taken by the government without due process.‖ Id. at 1181 
(citations omitted).  There, the court found the Department‘s 
policy of providing no opportunity for inmates to protest the 
amount of money to be deducted from the prisoner‘s account 
denied inmates due process of law.  The court thus began 
requiring a hearing that has come to be known as a ―Holloway 
hearing.‖   
However, a Holloway hearing merely determines the 
amount of money to be assessed from a prisoner‘s account; it 
does not provide an opportunity to challenge the fact of the 
assessment in the first place.  That determination is made at a 
misconduct hearing—such as the hearing over which Canino 
presided.  
A reasonable official at the time of Burns‘ misconduct 
hearing would have known, or should have known, that 
―inmates are entitled to due process with respect to any 
deprivation of‖ their prison accounts. Reynolds, 128 F.3d at 
179 (citing Mahers, 76 F.3d at 954).   An official should also 
have realized that the hearing over which Canino presided is 
the only opportunity under Pennsylvania law for an inmate to 
challenge whether his or her prison account should be 
assessed (not merely the amount to be debited).  Indeed, 
Pennsylvania officials should have been on heightened notice 
of the constitutional requirements with regard to such actions 
because Pennsylvania courts have previously upheld inmates‘ 
due process challenges of the assessment procedures.  See 
Holloway, 671 A.2d 1179.  
Thus, we do not think it is unreasonable for prison 
officials at the time of Burns‘ hearing to have known that: (1) 
Burns had a property interest in his prison account, (2) he was 
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entitled to due process before his account could be debited, 
(3) a later Holloway hearing would determine the amount of 
money to be deducted, but the actual disciplinary hearing was 
the only forum for determining if any money should be 
deducted at all, and (4) due process is violated when a 
determination to deprive an inmate of a protected interest is 
based solely on the uncorroborated statements of confidential 
informants.   
However, two matters give us pause in concluding that 
Burns is entitled to relief here.  First, although it was not 
unreasonable for a government official to have realized that 
due process must be provided in adjudicating whether a 
prison account can be debited, Burns is the first case that 
clearly established that the assessment itself implicates a 
prisoner‘s protected property interests, even if the account is 
not actually debited.  The devaluation in the property interest 
in the inmate‘s funds that results from such an assessment 
was not clearly established before Burns I, and we do not 
believe that a reasonable official could have foreseen the 
analogy to a judgment creditor that formed the basis of our 
holding in Burns I.  Second, we think it understandable that 
the existence of a later Holloway hearing could have caused a 
reasonable prison official to believe that, because the 
Pennsylvania state courts have found that a Holloway hearing 
was necessary to satisfy due process, that hearing was also 
sufficient to satisfy due process.   
Although some officials may have been able to deduce 
that a Holloway hearing was insufficient to satisfy due 
process, we do not believe that a reasonable official in 
Canino‘s position would have had a ―fair warning‖ that an 
assessment of the account prior to the Holloway hearing was 
subject to due process protections.   Prior to Burns I, inmates 
were only entitled to procedural due process  before their 
accounts were debited. Neither this court, nor any 
Pennsylvania appellate courts had held that an inmate was 
also entitled to procedural due process before the account was 
assessed, even if the fund was not debited before we decided 
Burns I.   
Thus we cannot conclude that the circumstances here 
were sufficient to give prison officials ―fair warning‖ that 
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their conduct was unconstitutional. United States v. Lanier, 
520 U.S. 259, 270 (1997).  Accordingly, we hold that they are 
entitled to qualified immunity. 
V. Remedies 
Although qualified immunity bars Burns from seeking 
monetary compensation, he may still be entitled to injunctive 
relief.  See Harris v. Pernsley, 755 F.2d 338, 343 (3d Cir. 
1985) (―The qualified immunity defense only applies, of 
course, to claims for money damages.‖). 
Burns argues that the district court should have 
provided remedies for all of the injuries that flowed from the 
flawed hearing, and that the remedies should have included:  
reversing the finding that he assaulted Mobley; remedying the 
increased security clearance that followed the assault on 
Mobley; rescinding the order separating him and Mobley that 
resulted in his transfer; and compensating him for his lost job 
and wages, and his out-of-pocket expenses resulting from 
these actions. 
However,  Burns‘ ―wish list‖ is not the least bit helpful 
to our attempt to fashion an appropriate remedy.  Prison 
officials would have been perfectly within their authority had 
they separated Mobley and Burns after the disciplinary 
hearing, regardless of its outcome.  In fact, prudence may 
well have required separation even if Burns had been 
exonerated at the hearing.  Prison authorities may still have 
had legitimate concerns that Burns would attempt to retaliate 
against Mobley because Mobley refused to exonerate him at 
the hearing.  The same can be said for the order transferring 
Burns to a different institution. Burns certainly did not have 
any right to serve his sentence in any particular institution.   
Prison authorities routinely transfer inmates for reasons of 
security, convenience or available space.  Burns surely did 
not acquire a vested right to remain where he was housed 
based upon this incident or the violations of his due process 
rights that followed.  The same is true of his job.  Job 
classifications are uniquely the province of prison authorities, 
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not the courts, and Burns did not have any vested right to a 
particular job that a court could enforce.
14
 
The Commonwealth argues that because prison 
officials could have imposed all of these penalties without 
any process at all, the constitutional violation did not cause 
any injury to Burns.  In the Commonwealth‘s view, since 
prisoners have no liberty interests in their prison location, 
Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 228-29 (1976), or 
placement in restricted housing units, Sandin, 515 U.S. at 
486, and no property interests in their jobs, prison officials 
were free to take these actions without any justification at all.  
The argument is problematic for two reasons.  First, it 
fails to recognize that these actions resulted from a 
constitutionally flawed hearing.  Second, it assumes that 
every remedy must be based upon a liberty or property 
interest.  In fact, while the injury must have been proximately 
caused by a violation of a protected interest, there is no 
requirement that the remedy be limited solely to that property 
interest.  See, e.g., Doe v. District of Columbia, 697 F.2d 
1115, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding prisoners whose Eighth 
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual 
punishment had been violated to be ―entitled to compensation 
for any physical injuries, pain and suffering, emotional 
distress, and impairment of their prospects for future 
employment proximately caused by the defendants' 
unconstitutional conduct‖ even though there is no property 
interest in employment prospects). 
In order to determine what remedies are appropriate, 
the Commonwealth asks us to adopt the reasoning of the 
district court and proceed as if the hearing did not implicate 
Burns‘ property interest and therefore did not require any 
constitutional protections.  The district court posed the legal 
question as: ―if the hearing had not implicated Plaintiff‘s 
property interest in the security of his account, . . . would the 
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  We do not, however, take any position on whether 
an inmate who loses a particular job or is transferred to a 
different institution in retaliation for his/her exercise of a 




disciplinary determination and its subsequent effects be 
upheld?‖ Burns, 2009 WL 1475274, *8. 
However, that does not advance our inquiry.  We 
cannot erase unconstitutional actions in order to uphold steps 
that were taken because of them.  The constitutional violation 
did occur, and the Commonwealth cannot put that genie back 
in the bottle. 
Rather, we must approach this from the perspective of 
what would have happened had Burns been afforded the 
procedural protections to which he was entitled.  In advancing 
their opposing arguments regarding the appropriate remedy, 
both parties rely on Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 260 
(1978). The question there was not whether the state could 
have taken certain actions against a group of students without 
violating their constitutional right to due process.  Rather, the 
Court considered whether the students would still have been 
suspended if they had been afforded procedural due process.  
See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. at 260.   
Carey lays out a helpful burden shifting scheme for 
resolving the remedial issue here. See Carey, 435 U.S. at 260 
(describing and approving of the Court of Appeals burden 
shifting scheme).  Under Carey, the plaintiff in a § 1983 case 
must prove that a constitutional violation has occurred, and 
that it was the proximate cause of his or her injuries.  Once 
the plaintiff clears both hurdles, the burden shifts to the 
defendant, who then has an opportunity to prove that the same 
actions would have occurred even if due process had been 
provided.   
Here, as we have explained, Burns has established a 
procedural due process violation and has pointed to all of the 
sanctions that resulted from that action.  Accordingly, the 
burden should have shifted to the Commonwealth to show 
that it would have taken the same steps if due process had 
been provided.  For those actions the prison officials can 
establish would have been taken regardless of the flawed 
hearing, the plaintiff is entitled to no remedy, as any remedy 
would constitute a windfall.  However, if the prison cannot 
establish that it would have taken the same steps even absent 
the constitutionally flawed hearing, the inmate is then entitled 
to relief.   
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We believe that had due process been provided, at 
least one consequence of the flawed hearing would not have 
occurred: Burns would not have been convicted of 
misconduct on the evidence presented.   The district court 
found that the evidence was insufficient to assess Burns‘ 
account and the state did not appeal that finding.   
SCI Graterford has one process for determining 
whether an inmate is guilty of misconduct and will have 
funds assessed  because of that misconduct.  The processes of 
finding guilt and allocating medical treatment costs are 
inseparably intertwined in a single proceeding with one 
adjudicator, one body of evidence, and the same burdens of 
proof.  In fact, the punishment of allocating costs to an inmate 
appears to flow automatically from the result of the 
disciplinary proceeding because it appears that an assessment 
is a mandatory consequence of a disciplinary action if the 
inmate is convicted of the infraction.  See 37 Pa. Code § 
93.12(c)(4) (―The Department [of Corrections] will charge a 
fee to an inmate for  . . . [m]edical service provided to another 
inmate as a result of assaultive conduct engaged in by an 
inmate to be charged the fee.‖ (emphasis added)).  This 
means that the prison could not have assessed Burns‘ prison 
account without a disciplinary conviction, but it also appears 
that the prison had to assess his account once Burns was 
convicted of the infraction.   
We agree with the district court that there is simply not 
enough evidence in the record to support the assessment of 
Burns‘ account, and the Commonwealth  has not appealed 
that finding.  Since the assessment is inextricably intertwined 
with the finding that Burns committed the charged infraction, 
we must also conclude that there is simply not enough 
evidence to support a finding that he was the one who 
assaulted Mobley. Therefore, we grant Burns‘ request that the 
disciplinary conviction be expunged. 
Nevertheless, prison officials were entitled to have 
taken the other actions regardless of the outcome of the 
disciplinary hearing, and Burns‘ request to reverse those 
measures must be denied. As noted above, he would 
otherwise receive a windfall.  He cannot rise above the 
legitimate institutional concerns of  prison officials merely 
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because they did not provide him with a proper hearing.  The 
Commonwealth argues that prison officials may have been 
wise to impose such sanctions as the separation order and the 
job changes regardless of the outcome of the hearing for fear 
of retaliation or other concerns, and we agree.  We are 
mindful that prison officials must make complicated and 
difficult decisions regarding inmate placement and privileges, 
and officials should clearly be afforded deference regarding 
such actions.   We are also mindful that the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act (―PLRA‖) provides that ―[p]rospective relief in 
any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend 
no further than necessary to correct the violation of the 
Federal right‖ and that such relief should be ―narrowly 
drawn,‖ ―extend[] no further than necessary to correct the 
violation of the Federal right, and [be] the least intrusive 
means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right.‖ 
18 U.S.C.A. § 3626(a)(1)(A).  
Moreover, our ―involvement . . . in the day-to-day 
management of prisons‖ must be limited.  Sandin, 515 U.S. at 
482.  Thus, our holding only disturbs the conviction that 
resulted from a constitutionally flawed hearing.  Consistent 
with the PLRA, we do not interfere with the prison‘s day-to-
day management of Burns. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the district court‘s finding 
that Mobley‘s refusal to testify did not constitute a due 
process violation, but we will reverse and hold that it is a due 
process violation for a prison hearing officer not to seek to 
view documentary evidence requested by an inmate unless 
there are legitimate institutional concerns that counsel against 
it.   We will nevertheless affirm the district court‘s finding of 
qualified immunity.  Finally, we will grant Burns‘ request to 
order the misconduct be expunged, but we deny his request 
for all other relief.   
